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The Populist Challenge and the Future of the 
United Nations Security Council 
 
JEREMY FARRALL†  
ABSTRACT 
 This article examines the potential impact of the 
populist challenge to international law on the United 
Nations Security Council.  The Security Council is 
often criticized as ineffective, unprincipled, and an 
anachronistic mechanism that reflects a power 
balance from the past, rather than the realities of 
today.  The article argues that the rise of populism is 
likely to further erode the Security Council’s 
legitimacy and efficacy.  At the same time, however, it 
emphasizes the need for greater nuance in the way 
that both the phenomenon of populism, as well as the 
relationship between national and international 
concerns, are understood and framed.  Taking these 
complexities into account, the Article explores three 
scenarios that could result from an escalating crisis of 
Security Council legitimacy.  The first involves reform 
and renewal.  The second comprises retreat and 
realignment.  The third encompasses reimagining the 
international peace and security architecture and 
creating something new. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The UN Charter bestows upon the United Nations Security 
Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international 
peace and security.1  Yet the Council is often criticized as ineffective, 
unprincipled, or an anachronistic mechanism that reflects a power 
balance from the past, rather than the realities of today.2  Criticism of 
the Security Council’s composition and the permanent member veto 
power originated before the Council even existed, as delegates at the 
1945 San Francisco Conference debated the merits of establishing a 
body that would elevate five member states above the rest, thus 
opening the door to a system of might makes right.3  Ultimately, the 
UN Charter endowed the five permanent members with the ability to 
place their national interests above the collective international interest 
by vetoing prospective Council action to maintain or restore 
international peace and security.4 
This article examines the potential impact of the populist 
challenge to International Law on the United Nations Security 
Council.  It argues that the rise of populism is likely to further erode 
the Security Council’s legitimacy and efficacy.  At the same time, 
however, the populist challenge might also create opportunities for 
constructive change by opening up new avenues to reinforce, 
recalibrate, or revamp the norms and institutions that the twenty-first 
century requires to maintain global peace and security.  For this to 
occur, there is a need for greater nuance in the way that both the 
phenomenon of populism, as well as the relationship between 
national and international concerns, are understood and framed.  
Taking these complexities into account, the Article explores three 
different scenarios that could result from an escalating crisis of 
Security Council legitimacy. 
The article proceeds in three sections.  Section I recalls the 
composition and powers of the Security Council for the maintenance 
of international peace and security.  Section II discusses the 
 
 1. U.N. Charter art. 24, ¶ 1. 
 2. See, e.g., RAMESH THAKUR, THE UNITED NATIONS, PEACE AND SECURITY 339-42 (2d 
ed. 2017). 
 3. Some states were against the very idea, with Mexico and the Netherlands arguing 
that the UN system would be fundamentally flawed and unjust if one country were able to 
prevent the Security Council from taking urgent action to maintain the peace.  See 
Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, Volume XI, 
Commission III, Security Council at 163-4 (Netherlands) and 333 (Mexico). U.N. Docs. 
1150/III/12 (June 22, 1945) and 459/III/1/22 (May 21, 1945). 
 4. U.N. Charter art. 27. 
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phenomenon of populism and its potential impact on the UN Security 
Council.  Section III then examines three different scenarios that 
could result from a populist-driven crisis of Security Council 
legitimacy.  The first scenario involves reinforcing the Security 
Council as the primary body responsible for the maintenance of 
international peace and security, through reform and renewal.  The 
second scenario would see UN member states employing a retreat 
and realign strategy, thus disengaging, whether formally or 
informally, from the UN Charter framework and investing their 
energy in existing or new peace and security coalitions at the regional 
or bilateral level.  The third scenario, reimagining and recreating, 
would envisage the end of the UN peace and security system and the 
creation of something completely new. 
I. THE COMPOSITION AND POWERS OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL 
At the San Francisco Conference on International Organization 
in 1945, the founders of the United Nations were motivated by the 
need to secure active participation of the most powerful states, thus 
creating an international organization that ‘would not stand idly by in 
the face of threats to international peace and security’.5  The UN 
Charter created an international peace and security system with 
unprecedented reach and ambition.  While the system has never 
fulfilled its prefatory aspirational objective of ridding the world of the 
‘scourge of conflict’,6 it has proven remarkably resilient.  Unlike its 
predecessor, the League of Nations, which failed to attract all key 
players into its membership, then lost existing key members when 
international friction escalated through the 1930s, the UN system has 
attracted and retained great and small powers alike, achieving 
practically universal membership.7 
The UN Charter created the Security Council as not just one of 
the six principal UN organs, but as the organ tasked with taking 
action to maintain international peace and security.  Chapter V of the 
Charter sets out the composition, functions and procedures of the 
Council.  Article 23 thus lists the five permanent members of the 
United Nations, namely China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom 
and the United States, and notes that the United Nations General 
 
 5. JEREMY M. FARRALL, UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS AND THE RULE OF LAW 58 (2007). 
 6. U.N. Charter preface. 
 7. On the League of Nations and its shortcomings, See PAUL KENNEDY, THE 
PARLIAMENT OF MAN: THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF THE UNITED NATIONS 8-24 
(2006). 
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Assembly (“UNGA”) shall elect the ten remaining non-permanent 
members that round out the Council’s current membership of fifteen.8  
Article 24 bestows upon the Council primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security.9  Article 25 then 
reinforces the power of the Security Council to take decisive and 
meaningful action by specifying that the Council’s decisions are 
binding on all UN member states.10  Chapter V is also significant for 
the way in which it shapes the Security Council’s decision-making 
dynamics by granting the permanent members under Article 27 the 
power to veto any prospective substantive decision.11 
The Council’s substantive powers are laid out in Chapters VI, 
VII & VIII of the Charter.  Chapter VI sets out the Council’s peaceful 
settlement powers, including the ability to call on member states to 
resolve their disputes peacefully through a range of dispute resolution 
mechanisms such as negotiation, enquiry, mediation, arbitration, 
conciliation and judicial settlement.12  Chapter VII provides that the 
Council shall determine the existence of threats to the peace, 
breaches of the peace and acts of aggression,13 and take action 
accordingly to maintain or restore international peace and security, 
including applying sanctions short of force,14 or authorizing the use of 
force itself.15  Chapter VIII of the Charter encourages the Council to 
make use of regional arrangements or agencies in meeting its 
responsibilities and exercising its powers under Chapters VI and 
VII.16 
II. HOW DOES THE POPULIST CHALLENGE IMPACT THE UN SECURITY 
COUNCIL? 
The other articles in this symposium document the nature and 
scale of the populist challenge to international law.  As Mark Graber 
explains, populist movements are primarily motivated by a desire to 
ensure that ordinary people can exercise some degree of agency over 
the exercise of public decision-making power.17  Populists tend to be 
 
 8. U.N. Charter art. 23. 
 9. U.N. Charter art. 24, ¶ 1. 
 10. Id. art. 25. 
 11. Id. art. 27, ¶ 3. 
 12. Id. art. 33. 
 13. Id. art. 39. 
 14. Id. art. 41. 
 15. Id. art. 42. 
 16. Id. arts. 52-54. 
 17. See The Populist Challenge to the International Legal Order (Symposium), 
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distrustful of the elites and experts who dominate public decision-
making, viewing these elites as removed from ordinary people and 
their everyday lives and thus unable to appreciate their needs, 
interests and fears.  Populists are thus deeply skeptical of official 
institutions, including the legislature, executive and judiciary, which 
they consider to represent and serve primarily the interests of the 
ruling elite, rather than of the people in general.  They support more 
direct, more proximate public decision-making that reflects and 
promotes their interests. 
There is a tendency in the contemporary literature to equate 
populism with a form of right wing politics that seeks to decrease the 
scale and reach of the government and the public institutions that 
support it.  The logical extension of equating populism with this 
politics is the assumption that populism axiomatically leads to 
nationalism, meaning that all populists would prefer their countries to 
retreat from international norms and institutions that place 
international causes above national needs.  However, as Graber 
shows, the commitment of populism to increasing the democratic 
representation of ordinary people, improving the transparency and 
accountability of government, and ensuring that elite-decision-
making is grounded in the experiences of everyday people in the real 
world, does not necessarily lead to politics or activism that is 
isolationist and/or nationalist.  It can also lead to politics or activism 
that is communitarian and/or internationalist. 
A case-in-point is the debate that is currently raging in Australia, 
where increasing temperatures throughout 2019 caused severe 
drought, which left the Australian bush tinder-dry, leading to the 
most widespread and destructive Australian bushfire season on 
record.  There is increasing frustration among ordinary people 
throughout the South-Eastern sections of Australia ravaged by fires 
and exposed to months of hazardous smoky air, that the nation’s 
politicians, from both the left and the right, have failed to take 
meaningful action to transform the Australian fossil-fuel-dependent 
economy and decrease Australia’s carbon emissions to slow climate 
change.  In this context, the populist perspective despairs at the 
inability of elite politicians of both left and right to take seriously the 
threat of climate change and to place local and global existential 
environmental needs above their traditional carbon-based-economy-
driven politics and policies.  Thus Australia, at the beginning of 2020, 
 
MARYLAND CAREY LAW (Oct. 17-18, 2019), 
https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mjil_symposia/2019/. 
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might be witnessing the early stages of a populist-based movement 
that could force elites to embrace carbon-neutral economic planning 
that elevates environmental concerns above the interests of fossil-fuel 
industries. 
A. The purported binary antagonism between national and 
international interests 
The tendency to equate populism with nationalism is often 
accompanied by the inclination to present national and international 
interests as inherently antagonistic.  This approach was dramatically 
employed by US President Donald Trump in his address to the 
United Nations General Assembly in New York in September 2019, 
when he proclaimed:   
The future does not belong to globalists.  The future 
belongs to patriots.  The future belongs to sovereign 
and independent nations who protect their citizens, 
respect their neighbors, and honor the differences that 
make each country special and unique.18 
The assumption underpinning this statement is, to channel the 
President’s typical vernacular, that nationalism is good, whereas 
internationalism is ‘very, very bad’.  This approach was echoed 
weeks later by Australia’s Prime Minister, Scott Morrison, in a 
speech to a prominent think-tank on international affairs: 
The world works best when the character and 
distinctiveness of independent nations is preserved 
within a framework of mutual respect.  This includes 
respecting electoral mandates of their constituencies.  
… We should avoid any reflex towards a negative 
globalism that coercively seeks to impose a mandate 
from an often ill defined borderless global community.  
And worse still, an unaccountable internationalist 
bureaucracy.19 
Both of these statements are underpinned by a reduction of the 
world into simplistic, binary stereotypes.  So you are either a patriot 
 
 18. U.S. President Donald Trump, Remarks to the 74th Session of the UN General 
Assembly (Sept. 24, 2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-
president-trump-74th-session-united-nations-general-assembly/. 
 19. Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison, In our Interest, Lecture at the Lowy 
Institute (Oct. 4, 2019), http://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/2019-lowy-lecture-prime-
minister-scott-morrison. 
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or you are a globalist.  In this mindset, it is impossible to be both.  
You either respect national sovereignty or you are part of an ‘ill 
defined, borderless global community’.  In this mindset, it is 
inconceivable that you could believe in global community and still 
respect national sovereignty. 
The portrayal of the national and international interests as 
inherently opposed ignores the origins and nature of international law 
and institutions.  For the creation of international law and institutions 
has always been grounded in the belief that national sovereignty and 
national consent are sacrosanct.  Put another way, international law 
was created to preserve the national interests of states.  It is for this 
reason that critical scholars decry the way that traditional 
international law elevates the concerns of the state over the concerns 
of individuals and that it protects and perpetuates a world-view that 
prioritizes the needs and interests of powerful, largely western states, 
such as the United States and Australia.  Indeed, the primary reason 
why the leaders of both states invested so heavily in the norms and 
institutions of the United Nations and the post-World War II liberal 
international order was to preserve and promote their core national 
interests, including democracy, human rights and the rule of law.  It 
is thus both ironic and counter-productive for the leaders of the 
United States and Australia to be framing international cooperation as 
contrary to their national interest.  Why has it suddenly become 
impossible for patriots and globalists to share a commitment to 
international law and institutions that promote both international 
peace and security and national prosperity and stability?  The next 
section explores the impact of the populist challenge on the activities 
of the UN Security Council. 
B. How does the populist challenge impact the UN Security 
Council? 
As the introduction to this article notes, the Security Council is 
frequently criticized for being ineffective or unprincipled or both.  To 
what extent does the populist challenge amplify or supplement these 
criticisms?  The previous section notes that populism is primarily 
concerned with empowering the ordinary person to exercise agency 
over the public decisions that affect them.  One might therefore 
expect populists to be deeply skeptical of an international institution 
like the UN Security Council, which is effectively an elitist and 
undemocratic entity within an elitist, unrepresentative organization of 
states. 
In order to anticipate the likely populist critique of the UN 
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Security Council, it is useful to begin with the likely populist critique 
of the United Nations more generally.  Of course, the question of 
what constitutes the UN can invite many different answers.20  Does 
the term refer primarily to the collection of 193 UN member states?  
Does it refer to the key decision-making bodies in which those 
member states participate, such as the UN General Assembly?  Does 
it refer to the UN Secretariat and its international civil service, which 
supports the decisions and policy agendas of those decision-making 
bodies?  Does it refer to the dozens of UN programs, agencies and 
subsidiary organs created by UN member states and/or those bodies?  
Or is it some combination of the above? 
The specific implications of the populist critique will likely 
differ depending on which of these incarnations of the UN the 
observer has in mind.  For present purposes, a useful starting point is 
the UN General Assembly, as it purports to represent the nations of 
the world.  What might populists make of the UNGA?  One 
interpretation of the UNGA is that as there are 193 UN member 
states, the UNGA provides a forum in which the views of all of the 
peoples of the world, including the ordinary people within all of the 
peoples of the world, can be aired, shared and taken into account.  
But the problem with this rosy take on the diversity of views on show 
in the UNGA is that the representatives of these countries are often 
even more removed from the ordinary people within their countries 
than their governments and public institutions are.  This is because 
they sit in New York as the representatives of those governments.  
Thus, rather than bringing decision-making closer to the ordinary 
person, the UNGA arguably extends the distance between decision-
making body and ordinary people, in both a figurative and a literal 
sense.  Populists are thus likely to be suspicious of the UNGA, 
viewing it as even more elitist than their own governments. 
Turning to the Security Council, then, one might expect 
populists to be even more critical, as the Council adds another layer 
of elitist decision-making over and above the already unconscionably 
elitist layer of the UNGA.  This is because the Council contains a 
small proportion of the 193 member states, with just fifteen Council 
members.  Moreover, the division of Council members into two 
categories, namely permanent and non-permanent, further 
exacerbates both the Council’s elitism and its level of removal from 
ordinary people. 
 
 20. Kennedy, supra note 7, at xvi (stating that “there are in practice many United 
Nations”).   
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At face value, one could therefore expect the populist challenge 
to heighten calls for the Security Council to become more democratic 
and more accountable to ordinary people in the ordinary countries 
throughout the world.  Yet this is where tensions arise between the 
populist ‘push’ against elitism and its variants that ‘pull’ towards 
nationalism.  For those populists whose country is a permanent 
member, such as those who are United States citizens, that permanent 
membership guarantees that the national interest, at least as it is 
interpreted and framed by the incumbent US administration, will be 
promoted and preserved on and through the UN Security Council.  
Thus, while populists might prefer that ordinary people exercised 
greater agency over their country’s representation on the Council, 
they may nevertheless derive reassurance from the fact that the veto 
power guarantees that the Security Council will not take a decision 
that undermines the core national interests of their country. 
It is worth recalling that the founders of the United Nations, 
including in particular the prospective permanent members, designed 
the Security Council as a body that would preserve the core national 
interests of the permanent members.  Thus the agency of those 
countries in Council decision-making was guaranteed.  For this 
reason, the relationship of populism with the Security Council is 
more nuanced.  On the one hand, the populist aversion to elite 
decision-making invites a negative reaction to the Council, which is 
an elitist institution par excellence.  But on the other, the preservation 
of the great powers’ national interests, in the form of the veto power, 
suggests that at least those populists from countries that possess 
permanent membership might be less antagonistic towards the 
Council due to the manner in which the Council preserves their 
countries’ national interests.  The corollary of this, however, is that 
populists from non-permanent member states are likely to be more 
skeptical and critical of the Council than those from permanent 
member states. 
III. THREE FUTURE RESPONSE SCENARIOS 
The following three sections each explore a different scenario in 
terms of the potential impact of the populist challenge for 
international law and institutions.21  The first scenario involves 
 
21 For an exploration of how these scenarios might unfold in relation to the 
backlash against global law and institutions pertaining to the environment, human 
rights, international peace and security, and trade and finance, see Peter G. 
Danchin, Jeremy Farrall, Jolyon Ford, Shruti Rana, Imogen Saunders and Daan 
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reform and renewal.  The second involves retreat and realignment.  
The third involves reimagining and recreating. 
A. Reform and Renewal 
The first scenario would involve reform and renewal of the 
Security Council, in order to make it less elitist and more proximate 
to the ordinary person.  There is, of course, a long tradition of efforts 
to reform the structure of the Security Council.  As noted above, 
when the United Nations was created, the total number of 
foundational UN member states was fifty-one and the Security 
Council initially had eleven members, with the five permanent 
members and six non-permanent members serving two-year terms.  
This meant that more than twenty percent of UN members were 
Security Council members.  By 1965, when the number of Council 
members was expanded to fifteen, there were one hundred and 
thirteen UN members.  This meant that more than twelve percent of 
UN members were Council members.  Today there are 193 UN 
member states. 
Proposals to reform the Security Council have been on the 
UNGA agenda since 1979.  In recent decades these efforts have 
tended to focus on expanding membership to provide greater 
geographic representation of the full UN membership.  Perhaps the 
most sophisticated Security Council reform proposal was advanced 
by then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, in his report entitled ‘In 
Larger Freedom’, which endorsed a number of recommendations by 
the 2004 High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change.  The 
proposal was that the Council should be expanded to 24 members, 
with more equitable regional distribution so that 6 seats would be 
allocated to each of Africa, Asia/Pacific, Europe and the Americas.   
Beyond these basic parameters, the Secretary-General requested 
UN member states to choose between two models.  According to the 
first model (‘Model A’), there would be six new permanent seats 
without veto and three new two-year seats, divided among the major 
regions.  According to the second model (‘Model B’), there would be 
eight four-year renewable seats and one new two-year, non-
renewable seat.  Ultimately neither option was endorsed by the 2005 
World Summit.  As Langmore and Thakur have noted, the fact that 
the Secretary-General advanced two models rather than one, as well 
as that neither secured the necessary support to be adopted at the 
 
Verhoeven, Navigating the Backlash against Global Law and Institutions, 38 
AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2020). 
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World Summit, indicate that while most UN members can agree in 
the abstract that reform should take place, they are not inclined to 
agree when it becomes clear precisely how concrete proposals will 
not benefit them.22 
Since the World Summit in 2005 a variety of state groupings 
have pushed different and often conflicting structural reform agendas.  
The Group of Four (G4) contains major powers and prospective 
permanent members Germany, India, Brazil and Japan.  Its preferred 
model is expanding the Council to 25 members, with the additional 
ten slots including six new permanent members, namely the G4 
themselves and two additional African states, as well as four new 
elected seats.   
The African Group contains all fifty-four African Union 
member states.  Its preferred model would expand the Council to 
twenty-six members, including the addition of seven African seats, 
two of which would be permanent.   
The Uniting for Consensus Group was created by countries who 
are united largely by their opposition to the agenda of the G4.  Its 
membership includes Argentina, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Italy, Malta, Mexico, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, San Marino, Spain 
and Turkey.  The preferred UFCG model would expand the Council 
to twenty-five members, with ten new rotating non-permanent seats.   
The L69 Group comprises more than forty developing states, 
who sponsored a draft resolution on Security Council reform entitled 
‘L69’.23  The L69’s preferred model would expand the Council to 
twenty-seven members, with the twelve new seats divided 
geographically as follows: four seats (two permanent and two non-
permanent) to Africa; three seats to Asia (two permanent and one 
non-permanent); two seats to the Latin America (one permanent and 
one non-permanent); one additional permanent Western Europe and 
Other seat; one non-permanent seat to Small Island Developing 
States; and one additional Eastern European non-permanent seat. 
This short summary of these various reform groupings and 
proposals neatly illustrates the considerable challenge of getting UN 
member states to agree on a game-plan to move forward with 
meaningful reform and renewal of the Security Council.  Moreover, 
 
 22. John Langmore & Ramesh Thakur, The Elected but Neglected Security Council 
Members, 39 THE WASH. Q. 99, 103 (2016). 
 23. Agenda Item 111 for the Sixty-First Session of the U.N. General Assembly, U.N. 
Security Council Reform Process, U.N. Doc. A/61/L69 (Sept. 11, 2007). 
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even if a single model were to achieve widespread support from the 
general membership, any formal proposal to reform the Council 
would require a formal amendment to the UN Charter.  This means 
that it would be subject to the veto of the permanent members, in any 
event.  This decreases the prospects of success for any formal reform 
and renew process.  Recognizing this, a number of largely smaller 
states have joined together in a grouping called Accountability, 
Coherence and Transparency’ (ACT), which seeks to promote 
procedural modifications that improve the Council’s accountability to 
the general UN membership.  This push for greater accountability 
and transparency might resonate with populist concerns, even though 
it is driven by the same types of expert diplomatic representatives 
who have been identified above as increasing the distance between 
ordinary people and decision-makers. 
B. Retreat and Realignment 
The second scenario would involve states responding to populist 
dissatisfaction with the UN Security Council by disengaging from the 
Security Council and the UN Charter collective security framework it 
serves.  According to this scenario, states might retreat and realign 
with like-minded and/or regional neighbor states to cooperate, or at 
least reach a mutual understanding about the parameters of, more 
proximate frameworks of principles to manage the risk of future 
violent conflict within and between such states.  There are a number 
of examples of regional or sub-regional security arrangements, 
including the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the Association of South-
East Asian Nations Regional Forum.  These arrangements are 
traditionally viewed as falling within and complementing the UN 
Charter framework for security.  But it is likely that these 
arrangements would form the first port of call for states who become 
disenchanted with the Security Council. 
It is unclear to what extent these existing security arrangements 
could combine to create both reliable and sustainable alliances and 
networks to maintain global peace and security.  Moreover, if 
existing arrangements prove incapable of promoting and protecting 
international security, what additional regulatory measures would be 
necessary to deter behavior by states and non-state actors that 
threatens the territorial integrity and political independence of other 
states?  With the retreat from the UN collective security system, 
would states revert to pre-United Nations principles of classic 
international law?  Or would they need to develop new principles?  
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What types of new rules and institutions might emerge in this new 
balance of powers era? 
It is also interesting to speculate as to how populists of different 
stripes and nationalities might respond to this second scenario.  To 
what extent would populist enthusiasm for disengagement from the 
UN Security Council and the collective security framework align 
with the relative benefits that their country gains from the status quo?  
It is conceivable that populists in states with little opportunity to 
participate on, or exercise influence over, the Security Council might 
see retreat as an attractive option, as they have never sat on the 
Council and have thus had little input into its decision-making and 
strategic policy directions.  
By contrast, populists from permanent members, or even non-
permanent members who frequently sit on the Council, might be 
more reluctant to embrace the retreat option if the consequence is to 
diminish rather than enhance the influence of their state over global 
affairs.  Here it is interesting to contrast, for example, the position of 
the United States in relation to the central global peace and security 
institution, the Security Council, with its position on the central 
human rights institution, the Human Rights Council, or indeed the 
central global trade institution, the World Trade Organization and its 
appellate body.  Presumably most populists would have supported the 
Trump administration’s walkout from the HRC and its steps to shut 
down the World Trade Organization’s Appellate Body, whereas they 
would be less enthusiastic if Trump were to propose abandoning the 
Security Council. 
A final point is that it is perfectly conceivable that states might 
engage in both of the strategies implied in the two first scenarios at 
the same time.  Thus, to channel a wise Muslim saying, a state might 
trust in Allah (i.e. supporting and engaging in UN reform proposals), 
while nevertheless tying up its camel (i.e. creating complementary 
regional alliances and networks, which could take on greater 
significance if/when the Security Council’s days become numbered). 
C. Reimagine and Recreate 
The third scenario is both the most fascinating and the most 
challenging to flesh out.  If the global community were to start from 
scratch with the mission of creating a new, fit-for-purpose framework 
of norms and institutions for maintaining global peace and security, 
what would they look like?  Who would sit at the most important 
decision-making tables, for how long, and with what powers?  How 
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would their legitimacy be reinforced and regenerated?  What 
structures, mechanisms, norms and resources would be required to 
guarantee the responsiveness, credibility and resourcefulness of the 
new system? 
It is beyond the scope of this brief article to speculate in any 
meaningful way on the likely substance of the new norms and 
institutions that would have to be developed to maintain global peace 
and security throughout and beyond the twenty-first century.  But it is 
possible to contemplate the type of process that might be required to 
deliver such norms and institutions.  As a starting-point, in order to 
create a new framework that resonates with and attracts the loyalty 
and commitment of people around the world, the process would need 
to reach beyond the traditional international law and United Nations 
paradigm that views states as the primary actor of international law 
and international relations.  While the Charter begins with the phrase 
‘We, the peoples of the United Nations’, thus creating the impression 
that the United Nations exists for all people, the United Nations 
system is founded on the understanding that states, rather than 
people, are the primary decision-making actors.  Only ‘peace-loving’ 
states can be members of the United Nations and the benefits and 
obligations of UN membership accrue to states as members.  The 
Charter further elevates the status of states as the primary actor by 
recognizing the principles of sovereign equality and of non-
interference in the domestic affairs of other states.24 
As a product of the mid-twentieth century, it was to be expected 
that the UN Charter would recognize the role of states as the primary 
subjects of international law and thus as the foundational members of 
the new United Nations organization.  But international law and 
international relations have moved on substantially in the seventy-
five years since the San Francisco Conference.  The obligations of 
states under international law now extend beyond those owed to other 
states to include those owed to individuals and groups of individuals, 
both within and beyond their own state jurisdictions.  Moreover, 
despite the fact that international law-making processes continue to 
prioritize the primary role and prerogatives of states, other actors are 
exerting increasing influence over the formation, modification, 
monitoring and enforcement of international norms.  These actors 
include non-governmental organizations and private sector 
corporations.  It is thus not such a radical thought to imagine a new 
model of international organization that empowers actors other than 
 
 24. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4, 7. 
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states to contribute to the decision-making processes that shape the 
new norms and institutions that are necessary to maintenance of 
international peace and security in and beyond the twenty-first 
century.  The new world organization would thus need to be not just 
for ‘the peoples of the United Nations’, but for all people. 
What process would be required to determine who the members 
of the new world organization should be?  A helpful starting-point 
would be the lessons derived from previous efforts by the UN itself to 
facilitate constitution-making at the national level.  For a serious 
process of reimagining and recreating a global system of norms and 
institutions that are fit-for-purpose in the twenty-first century would 
effectively represent, just as the San Francisco Conference did, an 
effort to develop a new constitution for the international community. 
The UN Guidance for Effective Mediation identifies a set of 
seven mediation fundamentals, which combine to deliver an effective 
(mediated) peacemaking process.25  Of particular importance to the 
development of an effective consultative process is the fundamental 
of inclusivity.  In a peacemaking context, the concept of inclusivity 
refers to the need to consider not just the views of the parties to the 
recently concluded conflict, who are typically the former government 
and any opposition or rebel groups, but critically also to take into 
account the perspectives of other stakeholders in the post-conflict 
society.26  These stakeholders might be women’s groups, religious 
communities, civil society organizations, or private sector 
corporations.  
While it would be demanding the impossible to expect a peace 
process to account for the views of all individuals from that society in 
formal peace negotiations, it is possible to create consultative 
mechanisms in such a way that they draw the widest possible 
diversity of perspectives into the process.  The UN Guidance 
suggests a number of strategies to promote inclusivity, including 
developing mechanisms to broaden participation and engage different 
perspectives throughout the various phases of a peacemaking process, 
as well as using social media and opinion polls, to inform and engage 
a wide range of participants.27  Adapting these lessons to the context 
of global constitution-making, it should be possible in an increasingly 
 
 25. Report of the U.N. Secretary General, Strengthening the Role of Mediation in the 
Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, Conflict Prevention and Resolution, Annex I, ¶ 16-52, U.N. 
Doc. A/66/811 (June 25, 2012). 
 26. Id. at ¶ 29. 
 27. Id. at ¶ 34. 
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interconnected world to devise a consultative process that provides an 
opportunity for not just ‘all the Peoples of the United Nations’, but all 
people in the world to feel included in the new process and therefore 
to hold a sense of ownership over and commitment to the new rules 
and institutions that emerge from the global constitution-making 
process. 
CONCLUSION 
As the articles in this Symposium attest, the populist challenge 
threatens to unpick global institutions and norms across a range of 
fields, including human rights, trade and the environment.  In the 
field of international peace and security, however, the global 
architecture seems less precarious.  The most obvious explanation for 
this is that the architecture itself was built on the premise that the 
most powerful states would place national interest above the 
international interest as a matter of course.  This meant that the 
system was structured in such a way as to fuse the international 
interest with the national interests of the most powerful states.  So 
what we have in the United Nations Security Council is an institution 
that already delivers a type of populist vision.  The big question is at 
what point the mid-twentieth century pragmatic internationalist 
populist vision, which deftly intertwined the nationalist and 
internationalist impulses in service of a global community, will 
become so out of sync with the contemporary populist and 
international visions, that it becomes vulnerable to decay, 
disengagement or destruction.   
The challenge in the field of international peace and security 
continues to be how to maintain the commitment of the world’s key 
constituent parts to engaging with the rest of the world in a way that 
eschews violence and promotes friendly relations.  The UN Charter 
system, for all its flaws and failures, has somehow managed to 
deliver a remarkably stable period in international relations, ensuring 
that the great powers of its age have not resorted to full-scale global 
warfare to achieve their objectives.  This is no small feat. 
This article echoes calls elsewhere in this symposium for the 
introduction of increased nuance in how the concept of populism and 
the challenges it poses for international law are understood.  It also 
argues that the relationship between the national interest and 
international concerns is more symbiotic than antagonistic.  For these 
reasons, the impact on the UN Security Council of the populist 
challenge to international law is less easy to identify or predict than 
FARRALL(DO NOT DELETE) 2/21/21  12:46 PM 
2020] THE POPULIST CHALLENGE AND FUTURE OF UN SEC. COUNCIL 89 
one might expect.  The article has explored three potential scenarios 
for how states and other actors might respond to the populist 
challenge.  Time will tell whether one, or more, or none of these 
scenarios come to pass.  But whatever the consequences of the 
populist challenge might be, this author is convinced, like the UN 
founders once were, that the future will belong to both patriots and 
globalists.       
